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Abstract 
 
This survey paper reviews the basic parameters of strategic positioning and 
execution in multi-functional financial services firms. We begin with a model of financial 
intermediation between end-users of the financial system as a way of locating specific 
financial intermediation functions. Shifts in intermediation shares are superimposed on this 
flow-of-funds profile, focusing on their implications for alternative business models 
available to financial institutions. The next section of the paper links the structural story to 
a normative strategic positioning matrix, which combines standard structure-conduct-
performance precepts with the potential realization of scale, scope, x-efficiency, market-
power, transaction- and information-cost dimensions, as well as imbedded risk exposures 
and conflicts of interest. The final section of the paper considers the value of natural hedges 
incorporated into multifunctional business platforms against the accompanying potential for 
a conglomerate discount in the share price. JEL G2, F23, L23. Keywords: Financial 
services. Banking. Strategic positioning. Strategic execution. 
 
 
Few industries have encountered as much ’strategic turbulence’ in recent years as 
the financial services sector. In response to far-reaching regulatory and technological 
change, together with important shifts in client behavior and the de facto globalization of 
specific financial functions, the organizational structure of the industry has been profoundly 
displaced and there remains a great deal of uncertainly about the nature of any future 
equilibrium in the industry’s contours. This paper assesses the factors that appear to be 
driving the structural reconfiguration of the financial services sector, broadly defined, and 
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the structural consequences. We then examine the strategic options that are open to 
financial firms in responding to -- and anticipating -- structural change, and the factors that 
seem to drive competitive performance with respect to market share and profitability. 
Financial Intermediation Dynamics 
The central component of any model of a modern financial system is the nature of 
the conduits through which the financial assets of the ultimate savers flow -through to the 
liabilities of the ultimate users of finance, both within and between national economies. 
[Smith and Walter, 2003] This involves alternative and competing modes of financial 
intermediation, or ’contracting’, between counterparties in financial transactions. A guide 
to thinking about financial contracting and the role of financial institutions and markets is 
summarised in Exhibit 1.1 The diagram depicts the financial process (flow-of-funds) among 
the different sectors of the economy in terms of underlying environmental and regulatory 
determinants or drivers as well as the generic advantages needed to profit from three 
primary linkages: 
• Fully intermediated financial flows. Savings (the ultimate sources of funds in 
financial systems) may be held in the form of deposits or alternative types of claims 
issued by commercial banks, savings organisations, insurance companies or other 
types of financial institutions that finance themselves by placing their liabilities 
directly with the general public. Financial institutions ultimately use these funds to 
purchase assets issued by non-financial entities such as households, firms and 
governments. 
 
• Investment banking and securitized intermediation. Savings may be allocated 
directly or indirectly via fiduciaries and collective investment vehicles, to the 
purchase of securities publicly issued and sold by various pubic- and private- sector 
organizations in the domestic and international financial markets. 
 
• Direct-connect mechanisms between ultimate borrowers and lenders. Savings 
surpluses may be allocated to borrowers through various kinds of direct-sale 
mechanisms, such as private placements, usually involving fiduciaries as 
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intermediaries. 
 
Ultimate users of funds comprise the same three segments of the economy — the 
household or consumer sector, the business sector and the government sector.  
• Consumers may finance purchases by means of personal loans from banks or by 
loans secured by purchased assets (hire-purchase or installment loans). These may 
appear on the asset side of the balance sheets of credit institutions for the duration 
of the respective loan contracts on a revolving basis, or they may be sold off into the 
financial market in the form various kinds of securities backed by consumer credit 
receivables.  
 
• Corporations may borrow from banks in the form of unsecured or asset-backed 
straight or revolving credit facilities and/or may sell debt obligations (for example 
commercial paper, receivables financing, fixed-income securities of various types) 
or equities directly into the financial market.  
 
• Governments may likewise borrow from credit institutions (sovereign borrowing) or 
issue securities directly.  
 
Borrowers such as corporations and governments also have the possibility of privately 
issuing and placing their obligations with institutional investors, thereby circumventing 
both credit institutions and the public debt and equity markets. Consumer debt can also be 
repackaged as asset-backed securities and sold privately to institutional investors. 
 In the first mode of financial contracting in Exhibit 1, depositors buy the 
’secondary’ financial claims or liabilities issued by credit institutions, and benefit from 
liquidity, convenience, and safety through the ability of financial institutions to diversify 
risk and improve credit quality by means of professional management and monitoring of 
their holdings of primary financial claims (both debt and equity). Savers can choose from 
among a set of standardized contracts and receive payments services and interest. 
 In the second mode of financial intermediation in Exhibit 1, investors can select 
their own portfolios of financial assets directly from among the publicly issued debt and 
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equity instruments on offer. This may provide a broader range of options than standardized 
bank contracts, and permit the larger investors to tailor portfolios more closely to their 
objectives while still achieving acceptable liquidity through rapid and cheap execution of 
trades – aided by linkages with banks and other financial institutions that are part of the 
domestic payments mechanism. Investors may also choose to have their portfolios 
professionally managed, for a fee, through various types of mutual funds and pension funds 
– designated in Exhibit 1 as collective investment vehicles. 
 In the third mode of financial intermediation, institutional investors buy large 
blocks of privately issued securities. In doing so, they often face a liquidity penalty – due to 
the absence or limited availability of a liquid secondary market – for which they are 
rewarded by a higher yield. On the other hand, directly placed securities can be specifically 
’tailored’ to more closely match issuer and investor requirements than can publicly issued 
securities. Market and regulatory developments (such as SEC Rule 144A in the US) have 
added to the liquidity of some direct-placement markets.  
 Value to ultimate savers and investors, inherent in the financial processes described 
here, accrues in the form of a combination of yield, safety and liquidity. Value to ultimate 
users of funds accrues in the form of a combination of financing cost, transactions cost, 
flexibility and liquidity. This value can be enhanced through credit backstops, guarantees 
and derivative instruments such as forward rate agreements, caps, collars, futures and 
options. Furthermore, markets can be linked functionally and geographically, both 
domestically and internationally. Functional linkages permit bank receivables, for example, 
to be repackaged and sold to nonbank securities investors. Privately placed securities, once 
they have been seasoned, may be able to be sold in public markets. Geographic linkages 
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make it possible for savers and issuers to gain incremental benefits in foreign and offshore 
markets, thereby enhancing liquidity and yield or reducing transaction costs. 
Shifts in Intermediary Market Shares 
Developments over the past several decades in intermediation processes and 
institutional design both across time and geography are striking. In the United States 
’commercial banks’ – institutions that accept deposits from the pubic and make commercial 
loans – have seen their market share of domestic financial flows between end-users of the 
financial system decline from about 75 per cent in the 1950s to under 25 per cent today. In 
Europe the change has been much less dramatic, and the share of financial flows running 
though the balance sheets of banks continues to be well over 60 per cent– but declining 
nonetheless. And in Japan as well as much of the rest of Asia, banks continue to control in 
excess of 70 per cent of financial intermediation flows. Most emerging market countries 
cluster at the highly intermediated end of the spectrum, but in many of these economies 
there is also factual evidence of declining market shares of traditional banking 
intermediaries. Classic banking functionality, in short, has been in long-term decline more 
or less worldwide. 
 Where has all the money gone? Disintermediation as well as financial innovation 
and expanding global linkages have redirected financial flows through the securities 
markets. Exhibit 2 shows developments in the United States from 1970 to 2000, 
highlighting the extent of commercial bank market share losses and institutional investor 
gains. While this may be an extreme case, even in highly intermediated financial 
disintermediation of the core deposit gathering and commercial lending finctions of banks 
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has been significant. 
Ultimate savers increasingly use the fixed-income and equity markets directly and 
through fiduciaries which, through vastly improved technology, are able to provide 
substantially the same functionality as classic banking relationships – immediate access to 
liquidity, transparency, safety, and so on – coupled to a higher rate of return. The one thing 
they cannot guarantee is settlement at par, which in the case of transactions balances (for 
example money market mutual funds) is mitigated by portfolio constraints mandating high-
quality, short maturity financial instruments. Ultimate users of funds have benefited from 
enhanced access to financial markets across a broad spectrum of maturity and credit quality 
using conventional and structured financial instruments. Although market access and 
financing cost normally depend on the current state of the market, credit and liquidity 
backstops can be easily provided. 
 At the same time, a broad spectrum of derivatives overlays the markets, making it 
possible to tailor financial products to the needs of end-users with increasing granularity, 
further expanding the availability and reducing the cost of financing on the one hand and 
promoting portfolio optimization on the other. And as the end-users have themselves been 
forced to become more performance-oriented in the presence of much greater transparency 
and competitive pressures, it has become increasingly difficult to justify departures from 
highly disciplined financial behavior on the part of corporations, public authorities and 
institutional investors.  
 In the process, two important and related differences are encountered in this generic 
financial-flow transformation. Intermediation shifts in the first place, from book-value to 
market-value accounting and in the second place from more intensively regulated to less 
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intensively regulated channels, generally requiring less oversight and less capital. Both 
have clear implications for the efficiency properties of financial systems and for their 
transparency, safety and soundness. Regulatory focus in this context has migrated from 
institutions to markets. 
Consequences for Institutional Competitive Advantage 
The basic microeconomics of financial intermediation have, to a significant extent, 
been reflected in the process of financial sector reconfiguration summarized in Exhibit 3.  
In retail financial services, extensive banking overcapacity in some countries has led 
to substantial consolidation. Excess retail production and distribution capacity has been 
slimmed-down in ways that usually releases redundant labour and capital. In some cases 
this process is retarded by large-scale involvement of public-sector institutions and 
cooperatives that operate under less rigorous financial discipline. Also at the retail level, 
commercial banking activity has been linked strategically to retail brokerage, retail 
insurance (especially life insurance) and retail asset management through mutual funds, 
retirement products and private-client relationships. Sometimes this linkage process has 
occurred selectively and sometimes using simultaneous multi-links coupled to aggressive 
cross-selling efforts. At the same time, relatively small and focused firms have sometimes 
continued to prosper in each of the retail businesses, especially where they have been able 
to provide superior service or client proximity while taking advantage of outsourcing and 
strategic alliances where appropriate. 
 In wholesale financial services similar links have emerged. Wholesale commercial 
banking activities such as syndicated lending and project financing has often been shifted 
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toward a greater investment banking focus, while investment banking firms have placed 
growing emphasis on developing institutional asset management businesses in part to 
benefit from vertical integration and in part to gain some degree of stability in a notoriously 
volatile industry.2 
 Exhibit 4 shows the global volume of financial services restructuring through 
merger and acquisitions activity from 1986 through 2002 – roughly two-thirds of which 
occurred in the banking sector, one quarter in insurance and the remainder in asset 
management and investment banking.  
 It seems clear, from a structural perspective, that a broad array of financial services 
firms may perform one or more of the roles identified in Exhibit 1 – commercial banks, 
savings banks, postal savings institutions, savings cooperatives, credit unions, securities 
firms (full-service firms and various kinds of specialists), mutual funds, insurance 
companies, finance companies, finance subsidiaries of industrial companies, and others. 
Members of each strategic group compete with each other, as well as with members of 
other strategic groups. Assuming it is allowed to do so, each organization elects to operate 
in one or more of the financial channels according to its own competitive advantages. 
Institutional evolution therefore depends on how these comparative advantages evolve, and 
whether regulation permits them to drive institutional structure. In some countries 
commercial banks, for example, have had to ’go with the flow’ and develop competitive 
asset management, origination, advisory, trading and risk management capabilities under 
constant pressure from other banks and, most intensively, from other types of financial 
services firms.  
 Industrial economics suggests that structural forms of competitive firms in any 
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sector, or between sectors, should follow the dictates of institutional comparative 
advantage. If there are significant economies of scale that can be exploited, it will be 
reflected in firm size. If there are significant economies of scope, either with respect to 
costs or revenues (cross-selling), then that will be reflected in the range of activities in 
which the dominant firms are engaged. If important linkages can be exploited across 
geographies or client segments, then this too will be reflected in the breadth and geographic 
scope of the most successful firms. 
A Simple Strategic Schematic 
 Exhibit 5 is a depiction of the market for financial services as a matrix of clients, 
products and geographies. [Walter, 1988] Financial firms clearly will want to allocate 
available financial, human and technological resources to those cells (market segments) in 
the matrix that promise to throw-off the highest risk-adjusted returns.3 In order to do this, 
they will have to appropriately attribute costs, returns and risks to specific cells in the 
matrix. And the cells themselves have to be linked-together in a way that maximizes what 
practitioners and analysts commonly call “synergies.” 
• Client-driven linkages exist when a financial institution serving a particular 
client or client-group can, as a result, supply financial services either to the 
same client or to another client in the same group more efficiently in the 
same or different geographies. Risk-mitigation results from spreading 
exposures across clients, along with greater earnings stability to the extent 
that income streams from different clients or client-segments are not 
perfectly correlated. 
 
• Product-driven linkages exist when an institution can supply a particular 
financial service in a more competitive manner because it is already 
producing the same or a similar financial service in different client or arena 
dimensions. Here again, there is risk mitigation to the extent that net revenue 
streams from different products are not perfectly correlated. 
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• Geographic linkages are important when an institution can service a 
particular client or supply a particular service more efficiently in one 
geography as a result of having an active presence in another geography. 
Once more, the risk profile of the firm may be improved to the extent that 
business is spread across different currencies, macroeconomic and interest-
rate environments. 
 
To extract maximum returns from the market matrix, firms need to understand the 
competitive dynamics of specific segments as well as, the costs and the risks imbedded in 
the overall portfolio of activities. Especially challenging is the task of optimizing the 
linkages between the cells to maximize potential joint cost and revenue economies, as 
discussed below. Firms that do this well can be considered to have a high degree of 
“strategic integrity” and should have a market capitalization that exceeds their stand-alone 
value of their constituent businesses. 
Economies and Diseconomies of Scale  
 Whether economies or diseconomies of scale exist in financial services has been at 
the heart of strategic and regulatory discussions about optimum firm size in the financial 
services industry. Are larger firms associated with increased scale economies and hence 
profitability and shareholder value? Can increased average size of firms create a more 
efficient financial sector? Answers are not easy to find, because they have to isolate the 
impact of pure size of the production unit as a whole from all of the other revenue and cost 
impacts of size, discussed below. 
 In an information- and transactions-intensive industry with frequently high fixed 
costs such as financial services, there should be ample potential for scale economies. 
However, the potential for diseconomies of scale attributable to disproportionate increases 
in administrative overhead, management of complexity, agency problems and other cost 
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factors could also occur in very large financial services firms.  If economies of scale 
prevail, increased size will help create financial efficiency and shareholder value. If 
diseconomies prevail, both will be destroyed. Scale-effects should be directly observable in 
cost functions of financial services firms and in aggregate performance measures.   
Many studies of economies of scale have been undertaken in the banking, insurance 
and securities industries over the years -- see Saunders [2000] for a survey. Unfortunately, 
examinations of both scale and scope economies in financial services are unusually 
problematic. The nature of the empirical tests used, the form of the cost functions, the 
existence of unique optimum output levels, and the optimizing behavior of financial firms 
all present difficulties. Limited availability and conformity of data present serious empirical 
issues. And the conclusions of any study that has detected (or failed to detect) economies of 
scale and/or scope in a sample of financial institutions does not necessarily have general 
applicability. Nevertheless, the impact on the operating economics (production functions) 
of financial firms is so important that available empirical evidence is central to the whole 
argument. 
 Estimated cost functions form the basis most of the available empirical tests.  
Virtually all of them have found that economies of scale are achieved with increases in size 
among small commercial banks (below $100 million in asset size). A few studies have 
shown that scale economies may also exist in banks falling into the $100 million to $5 
billion range. There is very little evidence so far of scale economies in the case of banks 
larger than $5 billion. More recently, there is some scattered evidence of scale-related cost 
gains for banks up to $25 billion in asset size. [Berger and Mester, 1997] But according to a 
survey of all empirical studies of economies of scale through 1998, there was no evidence 
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of such economies among very large banks. Berger, Demsetz and Strahan [1998] and 
Berger, Hunter, and Timme [1993] found the relationship between size and average cost to 
be U-shaped. This suggests that small banks can benefit from economies of scale, but that 
large banks seem to suffer from diseconomies of scale, resulting in higher average costs as 
they increase in size. The consensus seems to be that scale economies and diseconomies 
generally do not result in more than about 5% difference in unit costs. Inability to find 
major economies of scale among large financial services firms is also true of insurance 
companies [Cummins and Zi, 1998] and broker-dealers [Goldberg, Hanweck, Keenan and 
Young, 1991]. Lang and Wetzel [1998] found diseconomies of scale in both banking and 
securities services among German universal banks. 
 Except for the very smallest among banks and nonbank financial firms, scale 
economies seem likely to have relatively little bearing on competitive performance. This is 
particularly true since smaller institutions are sometimes linked-together in cooperatives or 
other structures that allow harvesting available economies of scale centrally, or are 
specialists in specific market-segments in Exhibit 2 that are not particularly sensitive to 
relatively small cost differences that seem to be associated with economies of scale in the 
financial services industry. A basic problem is that most of the available empirical studies 
focus entirely on firm-wide scale economies when the really important scale issues are 
encountered at the level of individual businesses.  
There is ample evidence, for example, that economies of scale are significant for 
operating economies and competitive performance in areas such as global custody, 
processing of mass-market credit card transactions and institutional asset management.  
Economies of scale may be far less important in other areas such as private banking and 
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M&A advisory services.  Unfortunately, empirical data on cost functions that would permit 
identification of economies of scale at the product level are generally proprietary, and 
therefore unavailable. Disturbingly, it seems reasonable that a scale-driven strategy may 
make a great deal of sense in specific areas of financial activity even in the absence of 
evidence that there is very much to be gained at the firm-wide level. Still, the notion that 
there are some lines of activity that clearly benefit from scale economies while at the same 
time observations of firm-wide economies of scale are empirically elusive, suggests that 
there must be numerous lines of activity (or combinations) where diseconomies of scale 
exist. 
Cost Economies of Scope 
 Beyond pure scale-effects, are there cost reductions to be achieved by selling a 
broader rather than narrower range of products? Cost economies of scope mean that the 
joint production of two or more products or services is accomplished more cheaply than 
producing them separately.  “Global” scope economies become evident on the cost side 
when the total cost of producing all products is less than producing them individually, 
while “activity-specific” economies consider the joint production of particular pairs or 
clusters of financial services. Cost economies of scope can be harvested through the sharing 
of IT platforms and other overheads, information and monitoring costs, and the like. 
Information, for example, can be reused and thereby avoid cost duplication, facilitate 
creativity in developing solutions to client problems, and leverage client-specific 
knowledge. [Stefanadis, 2002]. On the other hand, cost diseconomies of scope may arise 
from such factors as inertia and lack of responsiveness and creativity that may come with 
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increased firm breadth, complexity and bureaucratization, as well as "turf" and profit-
attribution conflicts that increase costs or erode product quality in meeting client needs, or 
serious cultural differences across the organizational “silos” that inhibit seamless delivery 
of a broad range of financial services.  
 Like economies of scale, cost-related scope economies should be directly 
observable in cost functions of financial services suppliers and in aggregate performance 
measures. Most empirical studies have failed to find significant cost-economies of scope in 
the banking, insurance or securities industries [Saunders 2000]. They suggest that some 
cost-diseconomies of scope are encountered when firms in the financial services sector add 
new product-ranges to their portfolios. Saunders and Walter [1994], for example, found 
negative cost, economies of scope among the world’s 200 largest banks – as the product 
range widens, unit-costs seem to go up, although not dramatically so. 
 However, the period covered by many of these studies involve firms that were 
shifting away from a pure focus on banking or insurance, and may thus have incurred 
considerable front-end costs in expanding the range of their activities. If these outlays were 
expensed in accounting statements during the period under study, then one might expect to 
see evidence of diseconomies of scope reversed in future periods. The evidence on cost-
economies of scope so far remains inconclusive. 
Operating Efficiencies 
 Besides economies of scale and cost-economies scope, financial firms of roughly 
the same size and providing roughly the same range of services can have very different cost 
levels per unit of output. There is ample evidence that such performance differences exist, 
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for example, in comparisons of cost-to-income ratios among banks, insurance companies, 
and investment firms of comparable size. The reasons involve differences in production 
functions reflecting, efficiency and effectiveness in the use of labor and capital, sourcing 
and application of available technology, and acquisition of inputs, organizational design, 
compensation and incentive systems – i.e., in just plain better or worse management. These 
are what economists call X-efficiencies. 
 A number of studies have found rather large disparities in cost structures among 
banks of similar size, suggesting that the way banks are run is more important than their 
size or the selection of businesses that they pursue. [Berger, Hancock and Humphrey, 1993; 
Berger, Hunter and Timme, 1993] The consensus of studies conducted in the United States 
seems to be that average unit costs in the banking industry lie some 20% above “best 
practice” firms producing the same range and volume of services, with most of the 
difference attributable to operating economies rather than differences in the cost of funds. 
[Akhavein, Berger and Humphrey, 1997] Siems [1996] found that the greater the overlap in 
branch networks, the higher the abnormal equity returns in U.S. bank mergers, while no 
such abnormal returns are associated with other factors like regional concentration ratios – 
suggesting that shareholder value gains in many of the US banking mergers of the 1990s 
were associated more with increases in X-efficiency than with reductions in competition. If 
true, this is good news for smaller firms, since the quality of management seems to be far 
more important in driving costs than raw size or scope. Of course, if very large institutions 
are systematically better managed than smaller ones (which may be difficult to document in 
the real world of financial services) then there may be a link between firm size and X-
efficiency.  
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 It is also possible that very large organizations may be more capable of the massive 
and “lumpy” capital outlays required to install and maintain the most efficient information-
technology and transactions-processing infrastructures. [Walter 2004] If extremely high 
recurring technology spend-levels results in greater X-efficiency, then large financial 
services firms will tend to benefit in competition with smaller ones. Smaller firms will then 
have to rely on pooling and outsourcing, if feasible. 
In banking M&A studies, Berger and Humphrey [1992b] found that acquiring banks 
tend to be significantly more efficient than the acquired banks, suggesting that the acquirer 
may potentially improve the X-efficiency of the target. Akhavein, Berger, and Humphrey 
[1997] found mega-mergers between US banks increase returns by improving efficiency 
rather than increasing prices, suggesting also that acquiring banks use acquisitions as an 
occasion to improve efficiency within their own organizations. Houston and Ryngaert 
[1994] and DeLong [2001b] found that the market rewards mergers where geographic 
overlap exists between acquirer and target, presumably due to expected X-efficiency gains. 
Revenue Economies of Scope 
 On the revenue side, economies of scope attributable to cross-selling arise when the 
all-in cost to the buyer of multiple financial services from a single supplier is less than the 
cost of purchasing them from separate suppliers. This includes the cost of the services 
themselves plus information, search, monitoring, contracting and other costs. And firms 
that are diversified into several types of activities or several geographic areas in addition 
tend to have more contact points with clients. Revenue-diseconomies of scope could arise 
from management complexities and conflicts associated with greater breadth.  
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 Some evidence on revenue economies of scope come from historical studies. 
Kroszner and Rajan [1994] found that U.S. bank affiliates typically underwrote better 
performing securities than specialized investment banks during the 1920s, when US 
commercial banks were permitted to have securities affiliates. Perhaps commercial banks 
obtained knowledge about firms contemplating selling securities through the deposit and 
borrowing history of the firm. If so, they could then select the best risks to bring to market. 
Likewise, Puri [1996] found that securities underwritten by commercial banks generated 
higher prices than similar securities underwritten by investment banks; this suggests lower 
ex ante risk for those underwritten by commercial banks.   
 Most empirical studies of cross-selling are based on survey data, and are therefore 
difficult to generalize. Regarding wholesale commercial and investment banking services, 
for example, one issue is whether companies are more likely to award M&A work to banks 
that are also willing lenders, or whether the two services are separable – so that companies 
go to the firms with the perceived best M&A capabilities (probably investment banking 
houses) for advice and to others (presumably the major commercial banks) for loans. This 
sometimes called “mixed bundling,” meaning that the price of one service (e.g., 
commercial lending) is dependent on the client also taking another service (e.g., M&A 
advice or securities underwriting), although the search for immediate scope-driven revenue 
gains may have led to some disastrous lending by commercial banks in the energy and 
telecoms sectors in recent years.  
 However, it is at the retail level that the bulk of the revenue economies of scope are 
likely to materialize, since the search costs and contracting costs of retail customers are 
likely to be higher than for corporate customers. There is limited US evidence on retail 
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cross-selling due to the regulatory restraints in place until 1999, and evidence from Europe, 
where universal banking and multifunctional financial conglomerates have always been 
part of the landscape, is mainly case-based and suggests highly variable outcomes as to the 
efficacy of bancassurance or Allfinanz. 
 In any case, the future may see some very different retail business models in which 
clients take advantage of user-friendly home interfaces to access Webservice platforms 
which allow real-time linkages to multiple financial services vendors. For the client, it 
could combine the “feel” of single-source purchasing with access to best-in-class vendors – 
the client “cross-purchases” rather than being “cross-sold.” Absent the need for continuous 
financial advice, such a business model could reduce information costs, transactions costs 
and contracting costs while at the same time providing client-driven open-architecture 
access to the universe of competing vendors. Advice could be built into the model by 
suppliers who find a way to incorporate the advisory function into their downlinks, or 
through independent financial advisers. If in the future such models of retail financial 
services delivery take hold in the market, then some of the rationale for cross-selling and 
revenue economies of scope could become obsolete. 
 Despite an almost total lack of hard empirical evidence, revenue economies of 
scope may indeed exist at both the wholesale and retail level. But they are likely to be very 
specific to the types of services provided and the types of clients served. So revenue-related 
scope economies are clearly linked to a firm’s specific strategic positioning across clients, 
products and geographies depicted in Exhibit 2. Even if cross-selling potential exists, the 
devil is in the details – mainly in the design of incentives and organizational structures to 
ensure that it actually occurs. And these incentives have to be extremely granular and 
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compatible with employee real-world behavior. Without them, no amount of management 
pressure and exhortation to cross-sell is likely to achieve its objectives. 
 Network economies associated with multifunctional financial firms may be 
considered a special type of demand-side economy of scope. [Economides, 1995] Like 
telecommunications, relationships with end-users of financial services represent a network 
structure wherein additional client linkages add value to existing clients by increasing the 
feasibility or reducing the cost of accessing them. So-called “network externalities” tend to 
increase with the absolute size of the network itself. Every client link to the firm potentially 
“complements” every other one and potentially adds value through either one-way or two-
way exchanges. The size of network benefits depends on technical compatibility and 
coordination in time and location, which universal banks and financial conglomerates may 
be in a position to provide. And networks tend to be self-reinforcing in that they require a 
minimum critical mass and tend to grow in dominance as they increase in size, thus 
precluding perfect competition in network-driven businesses. This characteristic may be 
evident in activities such as securities clearance and settlement, global custody, funds 
transfer and international cash management, and may to lock-in clients insofar as 
switching-costs tend to be relatively high. 
 What little empirical evidence there is suggests that revenue-economies of scope 
seem to exist for specific combinations of products in the realm of commercial and 
investment banking, as well as insurance and asset management. Empirical evidence 
concerning the existence of certain product-specific revenue economies of scope is 
beginning to materialize. For example, Yu [2001] showed that share prices of US financial 
conglomerates as well as specialists responded favorably when the Financial Services 
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Modernization Act of 1999 was announced.  The study found that the market reacted most 
favorably for the shares of large securities firms, large insurance companies, and bank 
holding companies already engaged in some securities businesses (those with Section 20 
subsidiaries allowing limited investment banking activities). The study suggested that the 
market expected gains from product diversification possibly arising from cross-product 
synergies. Another study by Lown et al. (2000) similarly found that both commercial and 
investment bank stocks rose on announcement by President Clinton on October 22, 1999 
that passage of the Gramm Leach Bliley Act was imminent. 
Market Concentration and Leadership 
 In addition to the strategic search for operating economies and revenue synergies, 
financial services firms will also seek to dominate markets in order to extract economic 
returns. This often referred to as economies of “size” as opposed to classic economies of 
“scale,” and can convey distinct competitive advantages that are reflected in either business 
volume or margins, or both. 
 Market power allows banks to charge more (monopoly benefits) or pay less 
(monopsony benefits). Indeed, many national markets for financial services have shown a 
distinct tendency towards oligopoly. Supporters argue that high levels of market 
concentration are necessary in order to provide a viable competitive platform. Without 
convincing evidence of scale economies or other size-related efficiency gains, opponents 
argue that monopolistic market structures serve mainly to extract rents from consumers or 
users of financial services and redistribute them to shareholders, cross-subsidize other areas 
of activity, invest in wasteful projects, or reduce pressures for cost-containment. 
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Indeed, it is a puzzle why managers of financial services firms often seem to believe 
that the end-game in their industry’s competitive structure is the emergence of a few firms 
in gentlemanly competition with nice sustainable margins, whereas in the real world such 
an outcome can easily trigger public policy reaction leading to breaks-ups and spin-offs in 
order to restore more vigorous competition. Particularly in a critical economic sector that is 
easily politicized such as financial services, a regulatory response to “excessive” 
concentration is a virtual certainty despite sometimes furious lobbying to the contrary. In 
the case of Canada, for example, regulators prevented two megamergers in late 1998 that 
would have reduced the number of major financial firms from five to three with a retail 
market share of perhaps 90% between them.  Regulators blocked the deals despite 
arguments by management that major US financial services firms operating in Canada 
under the rules of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) would provide the 
necessary competitive pressure to prevent exploitation of monopoly power.  
Financial services market structures differ substantially as measured, for example, 
by the Herfindahl-Hirshman index. This metric of competitive structure is the sum of the 
squared market shares (H=∑s2), where 0<H<10,000 and market shares are measured for 
example, by deposits, by assets, or other indicators of market share. H rises as the number 
of competitor declines, and as market-share concentration increases among a given number 
of competitors. Empirically, higher values of H tend to be associated with higher degrees of 
pricing power, price-cost margins, and returns on equity across a broad range of industries. 
For example, despite very substantial consolidation in recent years within perhaps the most 
concentrated segment of the financial services industry, wholesale banking and capital 
markets activities, there is little evidence of market power. With some 80% of the 
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combined value of global fixed-income and equity underwriting, loan syndications and 
M&A mandates captured by the top-ten firms, the Herfindahl-Hirshman index was still 
only 698 in 2002. This suggests a ruthlessly competitive market structure in most of these 
businesses, which is reflected in the returns to investors who own shares in the principal 
players in the industry – in fact, there has been a long-term erosion of return on capital 
invested in the wholesale banking industry. [Smith and Walter, 2003] 
 Another example is asset management, where the top firms comprise a mixture of 
European, American and Japanese asset managers and at the same time a mixture of banks, 
broker-dealers, independent fund management companies and insurance companies. 
Although market definitions clearly have to be drawn more precisely, at least on a global 
level asset management seems to be among the most contestable in the entire financial 
services industry, with a Herfindahl-Hirshman index of 540 among the top-40 firms in 
terms of assets under management.  And it shows very few signs of increasing 
concentration in recent years. 
 In short, although monopoly power created through mergers and acquisitions in the 
financial services industry can produce market conditions that allow firms to reallocate 
gains from clients to themselves, such conditions are not easy to achieve or to sustain. 
Sometimes new players – even relatively small entrants – penetrate the market and destroy 
oligopolistic pricing structures. Or there are good substitutes available from other types of 
financial services firms and consumers are willing to shop around. Vigorous competition 
(and low Herfindahl-Hirshman indexes) seems to be maintained even after intensive M&A 
activity in most cases as a consequence of relatively even distributions of market shares 
among the leading firms in many financial services businesses. 
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Berger and Hannan [1996] found that loan rates were higher and deposit rates were 
lower when banks operated in concentrated markets. These increased revenues, however, 
did not result in higher profits – instead, the study showed evidence consistent with higher 
cost structures in such banks than their counterparts in less concentrated markets. 
Akhavein, Berger, and Humphrey  [1997] found that banks which merge charge more for 
loans and pay less on deposits before they merge than other large banks -- banks that 
merged charged 17 basis points more for loans than the average large bank prior to 
merging. After the merger, however, this difference fell to about 10 basis points. This 
suggests that merging banks do not tend to take advantage of their increased market power. 
The authors contend that antitrust policy is effective in preventing mergers that would 
create market power problems. Siems [1996] reached a similar conclusion.  In a study of 19 
bank megamergers (partners valued over $500 million) in 1995, he rejected the market 
power hypothesis although he found that in-market mergers create positive value for both 
the acquirer and the target upon announcement. There was no relationship between the 
resulting abnormal returns and the change in the Herfindahl-Hirshman index. Still, 
concentration seems to affect prices. Beatty, Santomero, and Smirlock [1987] found that 
the higher the market concentration of the banking industry in a given region, the higher the 
premium paid to acquire a bank in that area. 
Proprietary Information and Imbedded Human Capital  
 One argument in favor of large, diverse financial services industry is that internal 
information flows are substantially better and involve lower costs than external information 
flows in the market that are accessible by more narrowly focused firms. Consequently a 
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firm that is present in a broad range of financial markets, functions and geographies can 
find proprietary and client-driven trading and structuring opportunities that smaller and 
narrower firms cannot.  
 A second argument has to do with technical know-how. Significant areas of 
financial services – particularly wholesale banking and asset management – have become 
the realm of highly specialized expertise which can be reflected in both market share and 
price-effects. In recent years, large numbers of financial boutiques have been acquired by 
major banks, insurance companies, securities firms and asset managers for precisely this 
purpose, and anecdotal evidence suggests that in many cases these acquisitions have been 
shareholder-value enhancing for the buyer. 
 Closely aligned is the human capital argument. Technical skills and entrepreneurial 
behavior are embodied in people, and people can and do move. Parts of the financial 
services industry have become notorious for the mobility of talent to the point of “free-
agency,” and people or teams of people sometimes regard themselves as “firms within 
firms.” 
There are no empirical studies of these issues, although there is no question about 
their importance. Many financial services represent specialist businesses that are conducted 
by specialists meeting specialist client requirements. Knowhow embodied in people is 
clearly mobile, and the key is to provide a platform that is sufficiently incentive compatible 
to make the most of it. It seems unclear whether size or breadth has much to do with this. 
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Diversification, Credit Quality and Financial Stability 
 Greater diversification of earnings attributable to multiple products, client-groups 
and geographies is often deemed to create more stable, safer, and ultimately more valuable 
financial institutions. The lower the correlations among the cash flows from the firm’s 
various activities, the greater the benefits of diversification. The consequences should 
include higher credit quality and higher debt ratings (lower bankruptcy risk), therefore 
lower costs of financing than those faced by narrower, more focused firms, while greater 
earnings stability should bolster stock prices. In combination, these effects should reduce 
the cost of capital and enhance profitability.  
 It has also been argued that shares of universal banks and financial conglomerates 
embody substantial franchise value due to their conglomerate nature and importance in 
national economies.  Demsetz, Saidenberg and Strahan [1996] suggest this guaranteed 
franchise value serves to inhibit extraordinary risk-taking. They find substantial evidence 
that the higher a bank’s franchise value, the more prudent management tends to be.  Such 
firms should therefore serve shareholder interests, as well as stability of the financial 
system – and the concerns of its regulators – with a strong focus on risk management, as 
opposed to financial firms with little to lose. This conclusion is, however, at variance with 
the observed, massive losses incurred by financial conglomerates universal banks in recent 
years in credit exposures to highly leveraged firms and special-purpose entities, real estate 
lending and emerging market transactions. 
Studies that test risk reduction often look at how hypothetical combinations could 
have reduced risk using actual industry data. In an early study, Santomero and Chung 
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[1992] found that bank holding companies which existed from 1985 to 1989 could have 
reduced their probability of failure had they been permitted to diversify into insurance and 
securities. Of the ten combinations the authors examined, the best combination is the bank 
holding company linking to both insurance and securities firms.  The only combination that 
would have increased the probability of bankruptcy over a stand-alone bank holding 
company is one encompassing a large securities firm. Boyd, Graham, and Hewitt [1993] 
tested whether hypothetical mergers between bank holding companies and non-banking 
financial firms decrease risk. In their sample of data from 1971 to 1987, they found that 
mergers between bank holding companies and insurance firms could have reduced risk 
while mergers between bank holding companies and securities firms or real estate firms 
could have increased risk. Saunders and Walter [1994] carried out a series of simulated 
mergers between US banks, securities firms and insurance companies in order to test the 
stability of earnings of the pro-forma “merged” firm as opposed to separate institutions. 
The opportunity-set of potential mergers between existing firms and the risk-
characteristics of each possible combination were examined. The findings suggest that there 
are indeed potential risk-reduction gains from diversification in multi-activity financial 
services organizations, and that these increase with the number of activities undertaken. 
The main risk-reduction gains appear to arise from combining commercial banking with 
insurance activities, rather than with securities activities.   
Too-Big-to-Fail Guarantees 
 Given the unacceptable systemic consequences of institutional collapse, large 
financial services firms that surpass a given threshold will be bailed-out by taxpayers. In 
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the United States, this policy became explicit in 1984 when the Comptroller of the 
Currency testified to Congress that 11 banks were so important that they would not be 
permitted to fail. [O'Hara and Shaw, 1990] It was clearly present in the savings and loan 
collapses around that time. In other countries the same policy tends to exist, and seems to 
cover even more of the local financial system. [US General Accounting Office, 1991] 
There were numerous examples in France, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and 
Japan during the1990s. Implicit too-big-to-fail (TBTF) guarantees create a potentially 
important public subsidy for major financial firms. 
 TBTF support was arguably extended to non-bank financial firms in the rescue of 
Long-term Capital Management, Inc. in 1998, brokered by the Federal Reserve (despite the 
fact that a credible private restructuring offer was on the table) on the basis that the firm’s 
failure could cause systemic damage to the global financial system. The same argument 
was made by JP Morgan in 1996 about the global copper market and one of its then-
dominant traders, Sumitomo. Morgan suggested that collapse of the copper market could 
have serious systemic effects. The speed with which the central banks and regulatory 
authorities reacted to that crisis signaled the possibility of safety-net support of the copper 
market in light of major banks’ massive exposures in highly complex structured credits to 
the industry. And there were even mutterings of systemic effects in the collapse of Enron in 
2001. Most of the time such arguments are self-serving nonsense, but in a political 
environment under crisis conditions they could help throw a safety net sufficiently broad to 
limit damage to shareholders of exposed banks or other financial firms. 
 It is generally accepted that the larger the bank, the more likely it is to be covered 
under TBTF support. O'Hara and Shaw [1990] detailed the benefits of TBTF status: 
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Without state assurances, uninsured depositors and other liability holders demand a risk 
premium. When a bank is not permitted to fail, the risk premium is no longer necessary.  
Furthermore, banks covered under the policy have an incentive to increase their risk in 
order to enjoy higher equity returns.  Kane [2000] investigated the possibility that large 
banks enjoy access to the TBTF guarantees in a study of merger-effects, although he did 
not distinguish between the stock market reaction to increased TBTF guarantees or the 
likelihood of increased profitability. He suggested further study to determine whether 
acquiring banks increase their leverage, uninsured liabilities, non-performing loans and 
other risk exposures, all of which would suggest that they are taking advantage of TBTF 
guarantees.  
 One problem with the TBTF argument is to determine precisely when a financial 
institution becomes too big to fail.  Citicorp was already the largest bank holding company 
in the United States before it merged with Travelers in 1998.  Therefore, the TBTF 
argument may be a matter of degree. That is, the benefits of becoming larger may be 
marginal if a firm already enjoys TBTF status. 
Conflicts of Interest 
 Potential conflicts of interest are a fact of life in financial intermediation. Under perfect 
competition and in the absence of asymmetric information, exploitation of conflicts of 
interest cannot rationally take place. Consequently, the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for agency costs associated with conflict of interest exploitation center on market and 
information imperfections. Arguably, the bigger and broader the financial intermediaries, 
the greater the agency problems associated with conflict-of-interest exploitation.  It follows 
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that efforts to address the issue through improved transparency and market discipline are 
central to creating viable solutions to a problem that repeatedly seems to shake public 
confidence in financial markets. 
In recent years, the role of banks, securities firms, insurance companies and asset 
managers in alleged conflict-of-interest-exploitation – involving a broad array of abusive 
retail market practices, in acting simultaneously as principals and intermediaries, in 
facilitating various corporate abuses, and in misusing private information – suggests that 
the underlying market imperfections are present even in highly developed financial 
systems. Certainly the prominence of conflict-of-interest problems so soon after the passage 
of the US Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, which removed some of the key structural 
barriers to conflict exploitation built into the US regulatory system for some 66 years, 
seems to have surprised many observers.4 
Moreover, recent evidence suggests that the collective decision process in the 
management of major financial firms impairs pinpointing responsible individuals, and that 
criminal indictment of entire firms runs the risk of adverse systemic effects. Monetary 
penalties and negotiated settlements neither admitting nor denying guilt seem to have 
emerged as the principal external mechanisms to address conflict of interest exploitation. 
Market discipline operating through the share price may, under appropriate corporate 
governance, represent an important additional line of defense.  
 There are essentially two types of conflicts of interest confronting firms in the 
financial services industry under market imperfections. [Walter, 2003b] 
 Type 1 - Conflicts between a firm’s own economic interests and the interests of its 
clients, usually reflected in the extraction of rents or mispriced transfer of risk. In 
addition to direct firm-client conflicts, indirect conflicts of interest could involve 
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collusion between the firm and a fiduciary acting as agent for the ultimate clients.5 
 
 Type 2 - Conflicts of interest between a firm’s clients, or between types of clients, 
which place the firm in a position of favoring one at the expense of another.6 
 They may arise either in interprofessional activities carried out in wholesale 
financial markets or in activities involving retail clients. The distinction between these two 
market “domains” is important because of the key role of information and transactions 
costs, which differ dramatically between the two broad types of market participants. Their 
vulnerability to conflict-exploitation differs accordingly, and measures designed to remedy 
the problem in one domain may be inappropriate in the other. In addition there are what we 
shall term “transition” conflicts of interest, which run between the two domains – and 
whose impact can be particularly troublesome. In the following sections, we enumerate the 
principal conflicts of interest encountered in financial services firms arranged by type and 
by domain (see Exhibit 6). 
 In wholesale financial markets involving professional transaction counterparties, 
corporations and sophisticated institutional investors, the asymmetric information and 
competitive conditions necessary for conflicts of interest to be exploited are arguably of 
relatively limited importance. Caveat emptor and limited fiduciary obligations rule in a 
game that all parties fully understand. Nevertheless, several types of conflicts of interest 
seem to arise. Asymmetric information is intuitively a much more important driver of 
conflict-of-interest exploitation in retail financial services than in interprofessional 
wholesale financial markets. Retail issues all appear to involve Type 1 conflicts, setting the 
interests of the financial firm against those of its clients. Conflicts of interest between the 
wholesale and retail domains – characterized by very different information asymmetries – 
can be either Type 1 or Type 2, and sometimes both at the same time. 
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 All else equal, it is likely that the broader the activity-range of financial firms in the 
presence of imperfect information, (1) the greater the probability that the firm will 
encounter potential conflicts of interest, (2) the higher will be the potential agency costs 
facing clients, and (3) the more difficult and costly will be the internal and external 
safeguards necessary to prevent conflict exploitation. If true, competitive consequences 
associated with conflict-exploitation can offset the realization of economies of scope in 
financial services firms. Scope economies are intended to generate benefits on the demand 
side through cross-selling (revenue synergies) and on the supply side through more efficient 
use of the firm’s business infrastructure (cost synergies). As a result of conflict exploitation 
the firm may initially enjoy revenue and profitability gains at the expense of clients. 
Subsequent adverse legal, regulatory and reputational consequences – along with the 
managerial and operational cost of complexity –  can be considered diseconomies of scope.  
 The potential for conflict-of-interest exploitation in financial firms can be depicted 
in a matrix such as Exhibit 7. The matrix lists on each axis the main types of retail and 
wholesale financial services, as well as infrastructure services such as clearance, settlement 
and custody. Cells in the matrix represent potential conflicts of interest. Some of these 
conflicts are basically intractable, and remediation may require changes in organizational 
structure. Others can be managed by appropriate changes in incentives, functional 
separation of business lines, or internal compliance initiatives. Still others may not be 
sufficiently serious to worry about. And in some cases it is difficult to imagine conflicts of 
interest arising at all. 
 For example, in Exhibit 2 cell D is unlikely to encompass activities that pose serious 
conflicts of interest. Others cells, such as C, have traditionally been ring-fenced using 
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internal compliance systems. Still others such as B and E can be handled by assuring 
adequate transparency. But there are some, such as A, which have created major difficulties 
in particular circumstances (such as advising on a hostile takeover when the target is a 
banking client), and for which easy answers seem elusive. 
Conglomerate Discount 
 It is often argued that the shares of multi-product firms and business conglomerates 
tend to trade at prices lower than shares of more narrowly-focused firms (all else equal). 
There are two basic reasons why this “conglomerate discount” is alleged to exist.  
First, it is argued that, on the whole, conglomerates tend to use capital inefficiently. 
It is argued that the potential benefits of diversification against the potential costs that 
include greater management discretion to engage in value-reducing projects, cross-
subsidization of marginal or loss-making projects that drain resources from healthy 
businesses, misalignments in incentives between central and divisional managers, and the 
like. For a sample of U.S. corporations during the period 1986-91, Berger and Ofek [1995] 
demonstrated an average value-loss in multi-product firms on the order of 13-15%, as 
compared to the stand-alone values of the constituent businesses. The bulk of value-erosion 
in conglomerates was attributed by the authors to over-investment in marginally profitable 
activities and cross-subsidization. This value-loss was smaller in cases where the multi-
product firms were active in closely-allied activities within the same industrial sector. In 
other empirical work, John and Ofek [1995] showed that asset sales by corporations result 
in significantly improved shareholder returns on the remaining capital employed, both as a 
result of greater focus in the enterprise and value-gains through high prices paid by asset 
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buyers. The evidence suggests that the internal capital market within conglomerates 
functions less efficiently than the external capital market. 
 Such empirical findings across broad ranges of industry may well apply to diverse 
activities carried out by financial firms as well. If retail banking and wholesale banking and 
P&C insurance are evolving into highly-specialized, performance-driven businesses, for 
example, one may ask whether the kinds of conglomerate discounts found in industrial 
firms may not also apply to financial conglomerate structures -- especially if centralized 
decision-making is becoming increasingly irrelevant to the requirements of the specific 
businesses.  
 A second possible source of a possible conglomerate discount is that investors in 
shares of conglomerates find it difficult to “take a view” and add pure sectoral exposures to 
their portfolios. Investors may want to avoid such stocks in their efforts to construct 
efficient asset-allocation profiles. This is especially true of performance-driven managers of 
institutional equity portfolios who are under pressure to outperform cohorts or equity 
indexes. Why would a fund manager want to invest in yet another (closed-end) fund in the 
form of a conglomerate – one that may be active in retail banking, wholesale commercial 
banking, middle-market lending private banking, corporate finance, trading, investment 
banking, asset management insurance and perhaps other businesses as well? 
Both the capital-misallocation effect and the portfolio-selection effect may weaken 
investor demand for shares of universal banks and financial conglomerates, lower their 
equity prices, and produce a higher cost of capital than if the conglomerate discount were 
absent.  This higher cost of capital would have a bearing on the competitive performance 
and profitability of the enterprise. It may wholly or partially offset some of the 
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aforementioned benefits of conglomeration, such as greater stability and lower bankruptcy 
risk through diversification across business lines. 
Conclusions 
 From a shareholder perspective, all of the pluses and minuses of size and breadth 
among financial services firms can be captured in a simple valuation formula: 
∑
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NPVf denotes the risk-adjusted discounted present value of a firm’s after-tax earnings, 
E(Rt) a represents the expected future revenues of the firm, E(Ct) represents expected future 
operating costs including charges to earnings for restructurings, loss provisions and taxes. 
The net expected returns in the numerator are then discounted to the present using a risk-
free rate it and a composite risk adjustment α t  -- which captures the variance of expected 
net future returns resulting from credit risk, market risk, operational risk, and reputation 
risk, and at the same time captures the correlations between such risks associated with the 
firm’s various activities.  
Strategic initiatives in financial firms increase shareholder value if they generate: 
(1) Top-line gains which show up as increases in E(Rt) due for example to market-
extension, increased market share, wider profit margins or successful cross-selling; (2) 
Bottom-line gains related to lower costs due to economies of scale or improved operating 
efficiency -- reduced E(Ct) -- usually reflected in improved cost-to-income ratios, as well as 
better tax efficiency; or (3)  Reductions in risk associated with improved risk management 
or diversification of the firm across business streams, client segments or geographies whose 
revenue contributions are imperfectly correlated and therefore reduce the composite αt.  
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 Assessing the potential effects of size and scope in financial services firms is as 
straightforward in concept as it is difficult to calibrate in practice. The positives include 
economies of scale, improvements in operating efficiency (including the impact of 
technology), cost economies of scope, revenue economies of scope, impact on market 
structure and pricing power, improved financial stability through diversification of revenue 
streams, improvements in the attraction and retention of human capital, and possibly TBTF 
support. The negatives include diseconomies of scale, higher operating costs due to 
increased size and complexity, diseconomies of scope on either the cost or revenue sides 
(or both), the impact of possible conflicts of interest on the franchise value of the firm, and 
a possible conglomerate discount in the share price. Bigger and broader is sometimes 
better, sometimes not. It all depends. 
The evidence so far suggests rather limited prospects for firm-wide cost economies 
of scale and scope among major financial services firms in terms of overall cost structures, 
although they certainly exist in specific lines of activity. Operating economies (X-
efficiency) seems to be the principal determinant of observed differences in cost levels 
among banks and nonbank financial institutions. Revenue-economies of scope through 
cross-selling may well exist, but they are likely to apply very differently to specific client 
segments and product lines. Conflicts of interest can pose major risks for shareholders of 
multifunctional financial firms, which may materialize in civil or even criminal litigation 
and losses in franchise value, There is plenty of evidence that diversification across 
uncorrelated business streams promotes stability, although unexpected correlation spikes 
(as between insurance and investment banking) may arise from time to time. 
Exhibit 8 shows the most valuable financial services in the North America, Europe 
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and the rest of the world in terms of market capitalization. Two observations could be 
made. First, the largest by whatever measures are used in the major industry segments are 
not necessarily the most valuable. Indeed, rank correlations between size and market value 
are low. And second, both lists are highly diverse. Generalists and specialists co-habitate at 
the top of the financial services league tables in both regions of the world. Both 
observations suggest that the key is in “how” things are done rather than “what” is done. 
While the burden of proof tends fall on bigger and broader firms, a few cases like Citigroup 
show diverse businesses subject to unrelenting pressure to sweat the equity by a demanding 
corporate owner insisting on market dominance together with benchmark attention of 
service quality, cost control and risk control, can produce superior returns  and that it can be 
done on a sustained basis 
In a way, the absence of clear signs of “strategic dominance” – generalists gaining 
the upper hand over specialists or the other way round – is encouraging. Any number can 
play, and there are no magic formulas.  The devil remains in the details, and there is a 
premium on plain old good management. From a systemic perspective as well, diversity in 
the financial system is probably a good thing, as firms competing across strategic groups as 
well as within them put a premium on both efficiency in financial allocation and innovation 
in the evolution of financial products and processes. 
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Products
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Exhibit 5
Product-Specific. Client-Specific and Geographic Strategic Linkages
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Exhibit 7
Indicative Matrix of Potential Conflicts of Interest
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41.9
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14.2
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11.4
11.2
9.3
Mitsubishi Tokyo
Sumitomo
NAB
Nomura
UFJ
Royal Bank
Mizuho
Commonwealth
ANZ
Scotiabank
Westpac
Kookmin (Korea)
Bank of Montreal
Toronto Dominion
CIBC
95.7
54.6
52.1
41.2
39.6
34.9
29.1
28.2
27.6
24.3
23.8
23.3
22.5
22.2
18.8
HSBC plc
RBS Group plc
UBS AG
Lloyds TSB plc
Barclays plc
HBOS Group plc
BNP Paribas
Deutsche Bank AG
ING Group
Grupo Santander
BBVA
Crédit Suisse
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Allianz AG
Munich Re
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95.9
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41.4
37.9
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36.7
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Citigroup
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Bank of America
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BancOne
American Express
JP Morgan Chase
Morgan Stanley
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US Bancorp
Goldman Sachs
Washington Mutual
REST OF WORLDEUROPEUNITED STATES
*Earnings volatility-adjusted GECS contribution to GE multiplied  by GE market capitalization. Data: Bloomberg.
Exhibit 8
Global Financial Services Firms Ranked by Market Value
September 30, 2002
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Notes 
 
1 For an early version, see Walter (1988).. 
 
2 The regulatory playing-field on which financial-sector reconfiguration has take place has 
seen substantial convergence, notably with the phasing-out of Article 65 of the Japan 
Financial Law and passage of the US Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999, both of which 
allow strategic interpenetration of the four major activities comprising financial services 
depicted in Exhibit 6 that was severely restricted before. 
 
3 Much of the following discussion relies on Walter [2004]. 
 
4 Public accounting firms and law firms have been the subject of serious conflict of interest 
allegations as well, but are considered here as part of the market infrastructure, as opposed 
to serving as direct participants in the financial intermediation function. 
 
5 An example would be collusion between financial firms and pension trustees to the 
ultimate detriment of pension beneficiaries. Cases involving Orange County, California 
derivatives exposures and “pay to play” municipal bond scandals involving the State of 
Massachusetts come to mind. See Smith and Walter [1997] Here the solutions would seem 
to involve writing better contracts between the clients and their agents through reform of 
state and local political processes. 
 
6Firm behavior that systematically favors corporate clients over retail investors in the 
presence of asymmetric information is a prominent example of this type of conflict. 
 
